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Abstract
Media users need information and knowledge to act as free citizens. From this basic democratic assumption, news stan-
dards for media performance can be derived. Porto’s (2007) model of the ‘interpreting citizen’ assigns a central role to the
diversity of interpretive frames. These frames enable citizens tomake judgments about societal issues and related political
positions. However, a theoretical foundation for classifying these frames in terms of their content is missing. We propose
to derive such a basis from democratic theories of citizenship, which assume that values define a citizen’s position vis-à-vis
the political sphere. Building on the cleavage approach from political science, we characterize which values organize politi-
cal debates. The results of a large-scale content analysis of German news media demonstrate which empirical insights into
media performance can be gained with a theoretically derived classification of value frames (most notably, measuring the
substantive content of plurality). Based on this, we discuss additional avenues for future research.
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1. Introduction
Theories of public opinion argue that democracy can
function only through public communication of a cer-
tain quality, as public communication creates the con-
ditions for citizens to act. Participatory approaches ad-
dress this requirement explicitly by characterizing the
function of public communication in a democracy as
the ‘empowerment’ of citizens to exercise their politi-
cal freedom (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002).
Liberal approaches to public sphere theory additionally
assume that public communication creates a ‘market-
place of ideas’ that allows citizens to form their own
opinion and identify representations of their political
stances. In this article, we discuss which performance
public communication must provide to enable this type
of active citizenship.
Porto (2007), based on his model of citizenship, de-
fines plurality as a key indicator of media performance.
He suggests operationalizing thiswell-established dimen-
sion of media performance (Christians, Glasser, McQuail,
Nordenstreng, & White, 2009) via measuring the diver-
sity of interpretive frames. Following Porto, we argue
that the communication of normative interpretations or
viewpoints is central to how individual citizens process
political issues and positions. However, our discussion of
Porto’s propositions reveals the need for a thorough the-
oretical foundation to adequately conceptualize the plu-
rality of interpretive frames (Section 2). In Section 3, we
introduce political values as a pivotal concept for such a
classification of plurality. Political values and value con-
flicts (cleavages) shape a citizen’s view of politics. Based
on this understanding, we propose a concept for the
empirical assessment of ‘value frames,’ that is, patterns
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of interpretation based on fundamental political values
(Section 4). This approach is in line with different under-
standings of media diversity, which McQuail (1992) de-
scribes as “diversity as reflection” (p. 144) and “reflecting
political divisions” (p. 163). Based on a large-scale con-
tent analysis of German news media, we then illustrate
the capabilities of the proposed instrument for examin-
ing media performance.
The goal of the article is to demonstrate that value
frames allow a detailed and theoretically grounded clas-
sification of the plurality of political positions across dif-
ferent issues. Themeasurementwe propose extends pre-
vious approaches to capture plurality as a central indica-
tor of media performance. Although the diversity of ac-
tors or topics is a manifest indicator of plurality that can
be coded with relative ease (Jandura & Friedrich, 2014;
McQuail, 1992), it only indirectly reflects the substantive
content of political positions, if at all. How media dis-
play actors or issues does not need to align with the di-
versity of political positions. It is possible, for instance,
that the media cover only a limited spectrum of posi-
tions although a diversity of actors is mentioned (Baden
& Springer, 2017). Instead of using actors or issues as
proxies for diversity, therefore, we propose to measure
viewpoint diversity directly to advance the study of me-
dia performance in communication research. However,
value frames thus also serve as an example of the integra-
tive and interdisciplinary potential of media and commu-
nication studies. On the one hand, the proposed instru-
ment builds on policy research, political sociology, and
political psychology. On the other hand, these disciplines
gain from studies of media performance that substanti-
ate the importance of public communication for the func-
tioning of democracy.
2. Models of Citizenship and Standards of Media
Performance
Democratic theory forms the basis for research on me-
dia performance in communication studies, from which
standards for assessing and classifying journalistic per-
formance are derived. However, sometimes the respec-
tive notions of the role of the citizen remain implicit.
A 2003 issue of Political Communication contained an
explicit debate on such ‘models’ of citizenship. It in-
cludes Zaller (2003) building on Schudson’s (1998) pre-
vious model of the ‘monitorial citizen,’ by combining it
with a critique of standards for comprehensive and fac-
tual reporting. While emphasizing the historical and so-
cial contingency of these standards, Zaller agrees with
Schudson in assuming that citizens must be able to crit-
ically overlook their political environment. Zaller postu-
lates that citizens alternate between superficial knowl-
edge of current events and an in-depth examination of
only those issues that require their attention. Because
attention plays a decisive role in this process, Zaller as-
signs journalism the task of providing a “burglar alarm”
(p. 121) to draw attention.
Zaller’s (2003) point of reference is the democratic
principle that politiciansmust be held accountable by the
citizenry. However, this accountability requires publicly
available information on important issues. Such informa-
tion should enable citizens to critically examine what
politicians’ activitiesmean for citizens andwhat deserves
their attention. This raises the question of how this infor-
mation must be shaped so that citizens can hold politi-
cians accountable. Zaller’s (2003) answer to this ques-
tion focuses entirely on how attention can be attracted.
His praise of alarmism as a function of journalism, how-
ever, ignores the obvious pitfalls of alarmist mediation
versus an enlightened perception of politics. First, what
is most sensational and draws attention is not necessar-
ily the same as what is important, in the sense of being
relevant to the social circumstances of life. A focus on
the former would relieve politicians of the pressure to
justify their actions and compromise citizens’ ability to
hold the politicians accountable. Second, the emotion-
alization and moralization typical of alarmist reporting
would replace an informed representation of processes
and positions. This would hinder citizens’ ability to ade-
quately assess what the positions or decisions of politi-
cians mean for them (Bennett, 2003).
Porto (2007) seeks to overcome these limitations in-
herent in the model of the ‘monitorial citizen,’ without
succumbing to the fiction of a citizen fully informed on
all matters, either. Drawing from political psychology and
the concept of civic competence, he discusseswhat kinds
of information citizens need to perform their role compe-
tently. In his resulting model of the ‘interpreting citizen,’
he assigns a key role to the availability of ‘interpretive
frames’ for “citizens’ ability to interpret political reality
in a consistent way” (p. 311). These interpretive frames
enable an understanding of why events or processes are
relevant for society. The frames offer an interpretation
of the extent to which a problem affects the social and
political life of a community, what defines the problem
at its core, what causes the problem, who is responsible
for it, and what measures should be used to solve the
problem. Thus, Porto follows a general frame definition.
He emphasizes that such interpretations are ex-
pressed by ‘sponsors’ who promote specific perspectives
on issues and events in public discourse. The resulting dif-
ferences in the publicly available interpretations of po-
litical reality are based on diverging interests or points
of view, which shape how a sponsor interprets an issue.
Employees’ or entrepreneurs’ interpretations, for exam-
ple, are likely to differ in what they see as the core of
an issue such as digitization (e.g., job security versus
profitability and security of investments) and what mea-
sures, therefore, are considered appropriate to resolve
the issue. Thus, to enable citizenship in a free society,
Porto (2007, p. 303) assumes that citizens must be able
to perceive diverse competing interpretations of societal
issues. Only the availability of such a plurality of interpre-
tations enables citizens to form their own opinions and
consequently, to perform their role competently.
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Plurality, as a necessary condition for the legitimacy
of politics in a democracy, is a well-established stan-
dard for public discourse in the theory of the public
sphere (Weiß et al., 2016). Porto (2007) transfers this
idea from the macro-level to the level of individuals’
competence to act. Again, he draws on an argument
from political psychology that assumes that only exam-
ining diverse competing interpretations creates the ba-
sis for consistent judgment by individual citizens. This
assumption is supported by research on framing effects
(Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). What is left unspoken
by Porto and in framing research, however, is the dif-
ference between ‘blind’ followership of positions and in-
formedpartisanship that acknowledges alternatives, and
thus, gains a deeper understanding of the meaning of
the political positions. The latter is described by liberal-
democracy theorist Dahl (1989, p. 307) as an “enlight-
ened understanding.’’
How can such an ideal be reached? On an individ-
ual level, examining diverse interpretive frames forms
the basis of competent citizenship. At the societal level,
this requires a media system that makes the pluralis-
tic competition of political positions visible. To deter-
mine whether the media provide this plurality, interpre-
tive frames must be defined and classified in a way that
reveals which divergent viewpoints have entered the
publicly available interpretation of reality. Porto (2007,
p. 309), therefore, calls for framing analyses to unveil
how the competition of interpretations is related to po-
litical power struggles. Such an analysis would necessi-
tate a classification of interpretive frames that makes
clear which respective position they support on a polit-
ical issue. What is needed is a concept that describes the
basic positions of political disputes in modern democra-
cies and makes the positions identifiable via interpretive
frames. We propose ‘value frames’ as such a concept.
Value frames are patterns of interpretation based on fun-
damental political values and interpret issues or events
in light of the latter (Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1996). These
values affect which specific position is taken on contro-
versial political issues.
To fulfill the analytical demands of Porto’s model of
the ‘interpreting citizen,’ two tasks arise from the previ-
ous considerations: First, the role of citizens in shaping
the interpretive frames by which policies and politicians
are judged must be clarified. This will further explain
how central political values are to interpretive frames.
Second, a classification of a potentially wide variety of
competing interpretive frames must be developed.
3. The Relevance of Political Values for Citizens’
Perspectives
When people use political ideologies (such as liberalism,
socialism, or nationalism) or religious beliefs as the ba-
sis of their political stance, they are moving within sys-
tems of interpretation. This article is an attempt to de-
scribe which interpretive transitions are necessary to
move from practical everyday experiences to the devel-
opment of a political mode of interpretation. To deter-
mine what is important for people in their political role
as citizens and therefore, what shapes their view of pol-
itics, interests related to practices of everyday life form
the starting point. These interests vary with individuals’
social situation (their interest in well-paid work or in
a cheap labor force, their interest in affordable hous-
ing or in a return on property investments, their inter-
est in unrestricted mobility or in an unpolluted environ-
ment, etc.).
Such interests reflect the options for and constraints
on the success of an individual’s life project. This per-
spective is necessarily egocentric, because the viewof so-
cial conditions is determined by the question what these
mean to the individual. This life-practical and interest-
related perspective of the private individual is separate
from their role as a citizen.
In their daily life, citizens experience in numer-
ous ways that their personal life project is dependent
on social circumstances. Therefore, shaping these cir-
cumstances becomes part of their individual interests.
However, the reflection of their personal situation and
interests on the sphere of politics includes a transforma-
tion. Individual interests are transformed into demands
for a system of rights and public services on which the
scope and legitimacy of one’s own interests depend.
When the interests of different actors collide, the individ-
ual depends on the institutions of the rule of law to deal
with and ideally resolve the collision of competing de-
mands. Such individual interests additionally presuppose
a public-service infrastructure, from public transporta-
tion to social housing to education, and much more.
This system of conditions for the realization of inter-
ests in societies is itself subject to change. The system
is permanently transformed through the pressure of so-
cial demands. Such concrete demands represent an ini-
tial transformation of interests. Interests that are put for-
ward as claims refer to the established or hoped-for gen-
eral recognition of their validity within society. An inter-
est becomes a claim by discursively and then practically
incorporating it into a systemof legally validatable claims.
In political science, this transformation is analyzed when
the role of parties in mediating between the concerns of
citizens and the system of power that establishes rules
of general validity is assessed. From this vantage point,
parties are organs of ‘interest aggregation’: Through this
aggregation, individual interests become part of a con-
cept or program for harmonizing different interests and
their interaction (see, for example, Lawson & Poguntke,
2004). Although this integration entails the validation of
some interests, it also limits their claim to validity in rela-
tion to others.
Citizens, therefore, must observe claims to polit-
ical validity that reflect their interests. According to
Faden-Kuhne (2012), citizens base this appraisal on their
internalized normative values “to assess the positions of
the parties on specific political issues or to determine
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whether the positions of the parties correspond to their
own ideas” (p. 92, authors’ translation). In practice, this
assessment is already fully structured, as it takes place
along established lines of conflict that can be character-
ized by maxims of good politics.
These maxims represent and articulate political val-
ues. Values are understood not as maxims by which in-
dividuals should conduct their lives, but as fundamental
ideas about the organization of society (Feldman, 2003).
Thus, values reflect social interests, but transform them
into ideas about desirable social conditions that give va-
lidity to an individual’s interests alongside those of other
citizens. Therefore, a claim to societally shared values is
not just a rhetorical technique. Even if seemingly instru-
mental and tactical, an appeal to values acknowledges
that for claims to be justified, they must refer to some
universally acceptable goal. Linking interests to values in
this way changes their substance: Only if they appear to
advance the success of living conditions in general can
they expect recognition even from those who do not
share the respective interests, but who would neverthe-
less be affected if these interests are met. Interest-based
demands that allude to generalizable values, therefore,
are an integral part of peaceful coexistence and conflict
resolution in society.
Following these principles in public discourse does
not end social conflicts, but it transforms the competi-
tion and conflict of social interests into a competition
for implementing politics based on different normative
principles. In modern democracies, this competition has
been condensed into conflicts of political values that are
established at various levels and thus, develop formative
power. These lines of conflict are characterized by cleav-
ages (Kitschelt, 1994; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967).
To illustrate the basic ideas of cleavages, those
present in Germany are given as an example. As in other
Western societies (de Wilde, Koopmans, Merkel, Strijbis,
& Zürn, 2019), three fundamental lines of conflict charac-
terize public discourse in Germany (Niedermayer, 2009).
In the first socioeconomic axis of conflict, the ideal of a
free market is opposed to an orientation toward welfare-
state services. This line of conflict transforms the tradi-
tional class-based opposition of labor and capital into a
dispute over the scope of state intervention in capital-
ist economies. Interests clash between the extremes of
the individual pursuit of private success and social jus-
tice through collectively organized solidarity. The second
sociocultural axis of conflict opposes libertarian to au-
thoritarian positions. This dimension of conflict concerns
the regulation of social order. One extreme position in
this cleavage regards universal civil rights as the guiding
principle of good politics. This position emphasizes par-
ticipation and plurality, while the opposing pole insists
on law and order being enforced by hierarchical author-
ities and sees conventional and conformist morality as
binding. Grande and Kriesi (2012) have pointed out that
these long-established dimensions of conflict are increas-
ingly challenged by globalization, which has produced a
third line of conflict. Divided betweenwinners and losers
of globalization, the first two cleavages are projected
on an additionally fundamental question. It contrasts in-
tegrative positions, which advocate transnational politi-
cal alliances and a multicultural composition of societies
at the national level, with demarcating positions, which
champion national sovereignty over international coop-
eration and insist on the ethnic homogeneity and demar-
cation of societies. This latter position is characteristic
of right-wing populism and negates that which gives po-
litical dispute its potentially peacemaking function: the
search for a common ground that integrates divergent
points of view. This function translates conflicts into a
question of ‘more or less’ regarding the social resources
spent on different interpretations of a basic value such
as ‘justice’ and to whom these interpretations are insti-
tutionally applied. The demarcation position, in contrast,
promotes an ultimate identity conflict of ‘either/or’ in
which only one’s ownposition is recognized as legitimate,
and opposing positionsmust be discredited, criminalized,
and ultimately, overpowered.
How these cleavages as conflicts between fundamen-
tal political values shape public discourse can be deter-
mined at several interdependent levels. The cleavage
concept originally identified social groups as sponsors of
the basic political values that divide an axis of conflict.
A social cleavage, thus, is understood as:
A deep-seated, robust, conflictual and, within the
framework of the intermediary system, organization-
ally solidified line of conflict between social groups,
which are defined by their socio-structural position
and the material interests and political values de-
rived from it, or primarily by their different values.
(Niedermayer, 2009, p. 35, authors’ translation)
Such groups form political milieus whosemembers share
the same basic political values and thus, distinguish
themselves fromothermilieus (Kösters & Jandura, 2019).
Political parties are the representatives and advocates
of a milieu’s understanding of good politics. How par-
ties compete for the implementation of their political
ideas can also be systematically characterized by their
position in fundamental conflicts of values (Niedermayer,
2009, p. 37). From this point of view, parties ensure that
the normativemaxims of fundamental conflicts of values
shape decision-making processes (Schön & Rein, 1994).
In their competition for power, parties present them-
selves in relation to fundamental values and thus, con-
tinually affirm them as important points of reference for
the citizenry’s formation of political opinions (Bartolini &
Mair, 1990). Last, conflicts of values are also reiterated
by journalists who use the conflicts as schemata for pre-
senting and evaluating political processes (Lee, McLeod,
& Shah, 2008).
Overall, public discourse is fundamentally structured
by the three main axes of conflict. The conflict of politi-
cal positions in the public sphere is carried out as a strug-
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gle of interpretive frameworks. In this struggle, actors in-
terpret a given issue against the background of the nor-
mative value positions the actors represent and classify
the issue by using respective value frames. Thus, public
utterances contribute to the value frames competition
(Scheufele & Engelmann, 2013).
With the help of value frames, our initial question
of what citizens should devote attention to can be an-
swered. Citizens find themselves reflected in those value
frames frompublic discourse that guide the citizens’ own
assessment and practical evaluation of politics. In this
sense, Dahlgren (2005) sees values as the core of “civic
cultures” (p. 18), that is, typical forms of citizenship that
are rooted in real-world experiences. To enable citizen-
ship through public communication, that and how guid-
ing principles of good politics are affected by a given is-
sue or proposal must be clear. For an informed under-
standing of politics, citizensmust be able to discern what
affects their own values, who stands up for the latter,
who contradicts these values, what is or can be done to
implement the values, etc. This must be made transpar-
ent through value frames in public interpretations of is-
sues. Values from the opposing poles of the fundamen-
tal cleavages thus fill in what the evaluative interpretive
frames in Porto’s (2007) concept of the ‘interpreting cit-
izen’ mean (see Section 2). In this sense, frames corre-
sponding to the extremes of the axes of conflict provide
a general basis for assessing media performance.
4. Empirical Assessment and Classification of Value
Frames along Cleavages
Through value frames, a universal standard of demo-
cratic media performance can be analyzed: the diver-
sity of political interpretations. Typically, the diversity of
speakers is used as an indicator of diversity (Jandura &
Friedrich, 2014; McQuail, 1992), although it has its lim-
itations as mentioned above (Baden & Springer, 2017).
With value frames, diversity of public discourse can be
determined at the level of the content. As the oppos-
ing sides of cleavages reflect basic political values that
shape attitudes on various issues, diversity can be deter-
mined not only in relation to single issues but also across
different policy fields. Political scientists use the cleav-
age concept to characterize the heterogeneity of political
positions in society, as well as between political parties.
Adapting this concept for framing research in communi-
cation studies provides a direct avenue for analyzing to
what degree political diversity in society and politics is
made transparent by the media. Conversely, a cleavage-
based analysis of value frames can offer political science
insights intowhich political positions of social groups and
political parties are represented in which media arenas.
Two extant studies follow this framework. Scheufele
and Engelmann (2013) propose a measurement of
value frames based on Porto’s (2007) considerations.
Regarding electoral debate, they state: “The media
should rather communicate to voters which part of the
value space is home to political parties and which coali-
tions of representation they therefore offer” (Scheufele
& Engelmann, 2013, p. 535, authors’ translation, em-
phasis in original). To measure value frames, Scheufele
and Engelmann follow the concept of ‘master frames’
(Benford & Snow, 2000) and theoretically distinguish
between cleavages. However, instead of sticking to
the established cleavages from political sociology (see
Section 3), the authors introduce a number of ‘univer-
sal’ as well as ‘policy-field specific’ values. Scheufele and
Engelmann’s distinction is not always straightforward
(e.g., the distinction between ‘solidarity’ and ‘justice’ as
universal values or between ‘solidarity’ as a universal
value and ‘state interventionism’ as a value specific to a
policy area).
In contrast, Höglinger, Wüest, and Helbling (2012)
work with the original differentiation between the eco-
nomic and cultural axes of conflict. The authors’ defini-
tion of frames, however, focuses entirely on how the
extremes of the respective conflicts align with the phe-
nomenon of globalization, in line with their research
question: “How do political actors justify the opposition
and support of globalization?” (Höglinger et al., 2012,
p. 229). Their content analysis stems from a research
group studying the potentially formative power of the
recently emerged cleavage between integration and de-
marcation for politics and public debate (Grande& Kriesi,
2012). Because of this limited focus, Höglinger et al.’s
(2012) operationalization cannot serve as a universal
classification of issues.
The following proposal for measuring value frames in
public discourse is intended as a solution to this problem.
Closely following the definitions of the extremes of each
of the three fundamental lines of conflicts from political
sociology (see Table 1), this framework allows an assess-
ment of the degree of diversity in news coverage—a cen-
tral feature of media performance in democracies.
Value frames can be applied to the public discourse
on various political issues: Regarding the environment
and climate protection, for instance, the socioeconomic
axis of conflict is particularly relevant. At one end of the
spectrum, welfare state-oriented positions stress strict
regulations to ensure that environmental damage does
not impair the living conditions of current and future
members of society. At the other end, market-liberal
positions emphasize how environmental regulations im-
pede economic growth. Balanced positions might argue
for regulations that reward environmentally sustainable
economic activities. On an issue such as assisted suicide,
the sociocultural axis will likely be salient. Libertarian po-
sitions would champion the individual’s right to decide
matters of their own life, while an authoritarian posi-
tion, depending on the cultural context, may favor the
position of churches or other authorities that provide
guidance about how lives should be lived—or ended. For
some issues, more than one axis of conflict is pertinent.
For climate protection, a position can combine, for ex-
ample, statements that favorwelfare state-oriented solu-
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Table 1. Fundamental value frames: Abridged version.
Value frame Description
Market liberalism Guiding principle: Individual pursuit of economic success.
Policies should improve the conditions of business activities, but refrain from regulation.
Individual economic effort is preferred over compensation for disadvantages.
Welfare state orientation Guiding principle: Participation by all members of society in economic welfare and social
and cultural life.
Policies should guarantee the welfare of all members of society and enable dignified living
conditions. Restrictive regulation of private businesses is necessary to share burdens.
Libertarianism Guiding principle: Respect for the freedom and self-determination of the individual.
Policies should guarantee the right to individual self-determination and to democratic
participation, for all human beings.
Authoritarianism Guiding principle: Respect for order and traditions of decency.
The basis for legitimate membership in the political community is a moral community based
on tradition and genealogy. Policies should uphold traditions and enable the unchallenged
enforcement of the legal order.
Integration Guiding principle: Problems and conflicts are solved through cooperation and compromise.
Democracy and human rights are regarded as the basis of political communities. Cooperation
between individuals, regions, and nations is the preferred way to solve problems.
Demarcation Guiding principle: Problems and conflicts are managed by the people uniting and the nation
standing its ground against adversaries.
The political community is understood as a fighting unit that needs to establish its national
unity internally and assert its interests externally. Cultural and political processes should
contribute to establishing identification with the nation.
Note: The full description of value frames is included in the Supplementary File that also contains coding instructions and examples.
tions with international cooperation. Thus, value frames
are comparatively universal indicators of media diversity
as the frames transcend issues, while providing more in-
formation than the mere number of different speakers.
5. Empirical Insights into Media Performance Through
Value Frames
We illustrate the benefits of an analysis of value frames
in public discourse through findings from a large-scale
content analysis. Selected findings are presented be-
low to demonstrate the capabilities of an analysis of
value frames to assess media performance. For this arti-
cle, 5,279 content items from 16 German media outlets
(print, television, radio, and online) were analyzed. The
sample consists of media outlets that represent different
types of German news media: Die Zeit and Der Spiegel
(weekly magazines), FAZ, SZ (quality daily newspapers,
conservative and liberal, respectively), Bild (tabloid
press), Rheinische Post (regional daily), taz and Junge
Freiheit (print outlets targeting the left and right fringes
of the political spectrum, respectively), Tagesschau,WDR
aktuell (public service television and radio news), RTL
aktuell (commercial television news), spiegel.de, faz.net,
bild.de, and tagesschau.de (online equivalents of the re-
spective outlets), and t-online.de (online news portal).
The content analysis comprises four periods of inquiry in
2018 (26 May–15 June, 29 June–5 July, 17 September–
7 October, 22 October–28 October). To avoid event- or
issue-related bias, this selection includes parliamentary
sitting weeks as well as non-sitting weeks. The data are
based on a random sample of all published articles that
focus on national politics, the filter criterion (sampling
error between 3% and 5%, except for a full survey of
Die Zeit, Der Spiegel, Junge Freiheit, Tagesschau, RTL ak-
tuell, and bild.de). For each article, the value frames
of up to three actors are coded. For each actor and
for each cleavage, coders assess whether the actor fa-
vors one side, whether the actor takes up a balanced
position, or whether there is no cleavage reference
(see the Supplementary File for the coding instructions).
Despite the relatively high level of abstractness of value
frames, the coding reliability across coders reached ac-
ceptable levels (Brennan and Prediger’s kappa between
0.8 and 0.9).
5.1. The Share of Value Frames in News Content as a
Prerequisite of Comprehension
As discussed above, Porto (2007) argues that citizens re-
quire media tomake transparent how political processes
and proposals relate to fundamental values. Therefore,
in the first step, we determine the extent to which differ-
ent types ofmedia display value frames (Table 2). Quality
daily and weekly print media as well as public-service
TV news provide users with the most extensive overview
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Table 2. Proportion of articles with value frames.
Media outlet Total number of articles (n) Share of articles with value frames (%)
Die Zeit 117 47.9
Tagesschau 193 44.0







Rheinische Post 256 34.0
taz 282 33.3
RTL aktuell 183 32.8
bild.de 441 29.5
Junge Freiheit 180 29.4
Bild 264 27.3
WDR aktuell 161 23.6
Total 5,279 35.6
Note: Cramér’s V = 0.1.
of normative frames that shape debates. The tabloid
Bild and news from commercial television program RTL
provide less transparency of normative positions. Media
that function as a forum for extreme political camps
(such as the right-wing Junge Freiheit) likewise rarely con-
tain value frames. Their high frequency (and therefore,
the high level of normative transparency) in the public
broadcaster Tagesschau, at the other end of the spec-
trum, is remarkable, especially as its 15-minute format is
restrictive when compared to broadsheets like Die Zeit,
SZ, or FAZ. Articles on the online edition tagesschau.de
also frequently contain value frames. Thus, public televi-
sion news is characterized by its extensive efforts to en-
sure the transparency of normative positions.
5.2. Plurality in the Mediation of Value Frames
The mere frequency of value frames in news is not the
only indicator of media performance. Citizens should
also be able to assess the breadth of a debate and the
different positions expressed on a given issue. Plurality,
therefore, is a necessary requirement, not only on the
individual but also on the systemic level. Value frames
allow characterization of how diverse specific issues or
larger policy areas appear in media coverage. Such an
analysis provides an avenue for assessing media per-
formance as required by liberal concepts of the public
sphere, according to the idea of a ‘marketplace of ideas.’
Through value frames, plurality cannot only bemeasured
by the diversity of speakers in a debate but also captured
directly via the normative foundations of publicly visible
policy concepts.
To illustrate the insight into plurality enabled by value
frames, their diversity is presented for two policy areas
as apparent in the coverage of the quality papers FAZ and
SZ. For one of the dominant topics in 2018, migration,
a comparison of the two papers reveals that they em-
phasize integrative and demarcating frames to an almost
equal degree (Table 3). A similar picture emerges for
their reporting on the broader field of economic issues,
where market-liberal and welfare state-oriented frames
are balanced (Table 4). FAZ additionally presents frames
that advocate free transnational economic relations (in-
tegration) over national-state protectionist ones (demar-
cation), while the reporting in SZ reverses the emphases.
The prominence of value frames thus differs in two
respects for the selected policy fields: First, different axes
of conflict are relevant for each policy field. In the case
of migration, the conflict is between integration and de-
marcation, and for economic issues, mainly the socioe-
Table 3. Coverage of the issue of migration: Distribution of value frames in quality newspapers.
Libertarianism Authoritarianism Integration Demarcation
Media outlet/frame n (statements) % Diff. to avg. % Diff. to avg. % Diff. to avg. % Diff. to avg.
FAZ 62 1.6 −3.2 1.6 −4.0 48.4 2.4 48.4 6.3
SZ 54 3.7 −1.1 3.7 −1.9 40.7 −5.3 51.9 9.8
All media 605 4.8 5.6 46.0 42.1
Note: Cramér’s V = 0.1.
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Table 4. Coverage of economic issues: Distribution of value frames in quality newspapers.
Market Welfare state
liberalism orientation Libertarianism Authoritarianism Integration Demarcation
Media n Diff. Diff. Diff. Diff. Diff. Diff.
outlet/frame (statements) % to avg. % to avg. % to avg. % to avg. % to avg. % to avg.
FAZ 79 31.6 5.0 32.9 −4.5 3.8 −1.1 — — 20.3 0.3 11.4 2.0
SZ 37 27.0 0.4 29.7 −7.7 2.7 −2.2 — — 16.2 −3.8 24.3 14.9
All media 350 26.6 37.4 4.9 — 20.0 9.4
Note: Cramér’s V = 0.2.
conomic axis of conflict as well as integration versus de-
marcation. Second, which value frames a medium em-
phasizes, therefore, can differ from issue to issue. For this
reason, it makes sense to examine the plurality of news
coverage separately by policy field or topical area.
Plurality of news coverage can further be assessed
through the degree to which competing normative
frames (such as a market-liberal and a welfare-state per-
spective) are presented in the same article. Across all
topics and news outlets, such a dialogical presentation
of conflicting positions within the same article rarely oc-
curs (in about one fifth of the articles; Table 5). Again,
with the exception of news from public-service radio
WDR aktuell, news from public-service broadcasting pro-
vides above-average performance. For the other media,
no clear hierarchy emerges. Presenting competing value
frames within one article is a parsimonious way to en-
sure plurality. However, the media can, of course, also
establish a ‘marketplace of ideas’ by representing com-
peting positions in separate articles. An analysis by issue
or policy area as presented in Table 3 and Table 4 allows
an assessment of this form of plurality.
5.3. The Media’s Emphasis on Political Values:
Editorial Lines
In addition to reporting on the positions of political ac-
tors, the media play an active role in the process of opin-
ion building in society. They take positions in opinion
pieces and editorials (Eilders, 2002) and by systematically
favoring selected political positions in their reporting
(Kepplinger, Brosius, & Staab, 1991). Taken together, this
makes up the media’s ‘editorial line.’ Measuring value
frames allows a precise diagnosis of these lines.
After examining specific issues and policy areas in
the previous section, our focus shifts back to the overall
news coverage of each outlet. We examine the chances
each value frame has of being reflected in the selected
media. The following media-specific patterns of value
frames emerge: 1) The conservative FAZ and the liberal
SZ are similar in their emphasis on libertarian versus au-
thoritarian positions. However, they differ significantly in
the weight they award to welfare state positions. These
clearly dominatemarket-liberal positions in SZ, while the
relationship is more balanced in FAZ; 2) the tabloid Bild
Table 5. Proportion of articles with opposing positions.
Media outlet Number of articles with value frames (n) Share of articles with opposing positions
Tagesschau 85 27.1
Der Spiegel 63 25.4
RTL aktuell 60 25.0
tagesschau.de 193 24.4






WDR aktuell 38 18.4
SZ 219 17.8
Rheinische Post 87 17.2
spiegel.de 209 17.2
Junge Freiheit 53 11.3
taz 94 5.3
Total 1,880 19.9
Note: Cramér’s V = 0.1.
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Table 6. Distribution of value frames depending on the medium.
Market Welfare state
liberalism orientation Libertarianism Authoritarianism Integration Demarcation
Diff. Diff. Diff. Diff. Diff. Diff.
Media n to to to to to to
outlet/frame (statements) % avg. % avg. % avg. % avg. % avg. % avg.
FAZ 364 11.0 3.5 17.9 2.7 12.4 −1.3 4.1 −1.4 37.1 −0.2 17.6 −3.3
SZ 300 7.7 0.2 20.0 4.8 12.0 −1.7 2.3 −3.2 36.7 −0.4 21.3 0.4
Der Spiegel 82 17.1 9.6 15.9 0.7 15.9 2.2 7.3 1.8 29.3 −8.0 14.6 −6.3
Die Zeit 75 6.7 −0.8 12.0 −3.2 12.0 −1.7 4.0 −1.5 37.3 0.0 28.0 7.1
Bild 95 8.4 0.9 12.6 −2.6 10.5 −3.2 11.6 6.1 27.4 −9.9 29.5 8.6
Junge Freiheit 65 1.5 −6.0 3.1 −12.1 15.4 1.7 4.6 −0.9 40.0 2.7 35.4 14.5
taz 110 4.5 −3.0 21.8 6.6 28.2 14.5 3.6 −1.9 26.4 −10.9 15.5 −5.4
Rheinische Post 99 8.1 0.6 28.3 13.1 18.2 4.5 7.1 1.6 30.3 −7.0 8.1 −12.8
Tagesschau 125 12.0 4.5 14.4 −0.8 11.2 −2.5 2.4 −3.1 37.6 0.3 22.4 1.5
RTL aktuell 85 4.7 −2.8 16.5 1.3 9.4 −4.3 7.1 1.6 36.5 −0.8 25.9 5.0
WDR aktuell 52 5.8 −1.7 25.0 9.8 1.9 −11.8 5.8 0.3 42.3 5.0 19.2 −1.7
bild.de 169 8.9 1.4 10.1 −5.1 14.8 1.1 6.5 1.0 37.9 0.6 21.9 1.0
faz.net 239 8.4 0.9 16.7 1.5 13.4 −0.3 6.7 1.2 36.4 −0.9 18.4 −2.5
spiegel.de 282 3.5 −4.0 9.9 −5.3 13.8 0.1 7.1 1.6 41.5 4.2 24.1 3.2
tagesschau.de 285 4.6 −2.9 12.3 −2.9 13.3 −0.4 7.0 1.5 44.9 7.6 17.9 −3.0
t-online.de 134 5.2 −2.3 8.2 −7.0 15.7 2.0 4.5 −1.0 38.1 0.8 28.4 7.5
Total 2,561 7.5 15.2 13.7 5.5 37.3 20.9
Notes: Cramér’s V = 0.1. Differences of more than +/− 5% from the overall average are indicated in bold.
stands out with its high proportion of authoritarian po-
sitions, which is more than twice as high as the aver-
age of the sample as a whole; and 3) media outlets on
the fringes of the political spectrum put forward value
frames that correspond to the outlets’ particular politi-
cal profile in the media market. In taz, libertarian posi-
tions are strongly pronounced, while demarcating posi-
tions are more prominent in Junge Freiheit than in any
other outlet (Table 6).
Thus, the analysis uncovers the preferred political val-
ues of each medium, reflecting their ‘editorial line,’ that
is, the active position of the media in political debates.
An analysis of three dimensions of value frames is clearly
more precise than the positioning on the left–right axis
found in previous studies. Value frames indicate in a dif-
ferentiated manner which normative positions are fa-
vored in each medium. Such an analysis of media cover-
age is also more comprehensive than an analysis of edi-
torials or of individual controversial issues alone.
6. Conclusions: Value Frames as a Key to Media
Performance
The analysis of value frames in public discourse provides
a tool for assessing to what extent mediated public com-
munication provides users with a basis for evaluating pol-
itics as citizens of a liberal democracy. How media com-
municate value frames is crucial to the meaning that ‘in-
terpreting citizens’ assign to the mediated portrayals of
politics. Media lay the foundation for the orientation of
the citizenry regarding their basic understanding of good
politics—and who represents them or opposes them.
To the extent that the media present competing
value frames for a given area of politics, the media also
fulfill their role as providers of a ‘marketplace of ideas’
to different degrees. Value frames allow a direct classifi-
cation of the substantive content of plurality. They pro-
vide information about the extent of plurality for specific
issues and across policy fields. Thus, value frames are
suited for dealing with the core dimensions of theories
of the public sphere.
Limitations concerning the explanatory power of
value frames in characterizing political positions result
from shifts in the political lines of conflict. For example,
right-wing populist actors link the demand for more par-
ticipation, which thus far has been defined as a liber-
tarian position on the sociocultural axis of conflict, with
law and order positions that mark the opposite pole.
Such discursive shifts make it necessary to continuously
monitor the applicability of conflict positions and adjust
them if necessary. Value frames reflect basic political po-
sitions in political statements. Thus, the frames do not in-
clude all aspects of political positions (such as pragmatic
or efficiency-oriented evaluations). However, the value
frames describe a central part of the political discourse
that emphasizes the forum function of the media.
In addition to characterizing the media’s role as a
‘marketplace of ideas,’ value frames provide an addi-
tional approach for journalism research. The ‘editorial
line’ of media outlets can be characterized more pre-
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cisely by their position on the axes of conflict that fun-
damentally structure the political debate. The position
of a medium can also be specified in a more differenti-
ated manner for specific policy areas or sections of an
outlet. In this way, the inner heterogeneity and diversity
of editorial work are uncovered.
Although the present article is limited to an analy-
sis of media coverage at the level of outlets and topics,
value frames can be applied in additional ways. One ex-
tension concerns an actor-based coding of value frames.
If the positions of specific political actors (individuals or
organizations) on a given issue are expressed in an ar-
ticle, the value frames inherent in the respective state-
ments can be attributed to the actor. This allows an anal-
ysis of mediated portrayals of political actors and their
ownpositioning in different policy areas. For political par-
ties, such an analysis can be compared to classifications
of party positions from political science (Franzmann &
Kaiser, 2006). Thus, value frames provide an avenue
for studying the so-called ‘media-party parallelism’ (van
Kempen, 2007). This provides insights into the different
chances of parties for public resonance, that is, their abil-
ity to communicate their normative positions in different
media arenas.
Value frames also form a bridging concept for analyz-
ing political milieus in political sociology. Content analy-
ses of value frames provide information about the extent
to which the political values typical of a given milieu are
represented in public discourse. Furthermore, it can be
shown which medium acts as a forum for which specific
milieus. Thus, communication studies can contribute to
the ongoing debate in political science of a ‘crisis of rep-
resentation’ (Linden & Thaa, 2011). The inclusion of mi-
lieus in the process of opinion-building depends on the
public representation of milieu-specific political values.
Therefore, an analysis of media performance through
value frames can contribute to an understanding of the
role of themedia in political integration or the fragmenta-
tion of societies. Thus, value frames are useful for dealing
with a range of questions related to democratic theory
on the role of the media in political processes.
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